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PRACTICAL EQUALITY AND THE LIMITS 
OF SECOND BEST STRATEGIES FOR 
JUSTICE 
PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A 
DIVIDED NATION. By Robert L. Tsai.1 W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2019. Pp. 276. $27.95 (Cloth). 
Franita Tolson2 
In Practical Equality: Forging Justice in a Divided Nation, 
Professor Robert Tsai argues that doing the hard work of equality 
sometimes requires the use of doctrines that are not expressly 
equality-based but can achieve the same goals as equality 
doctrine. These “second-order” doctrines, which include fair play, 
reasonableness, anti-cruelty, and free speech, are vehicles through 
which equality can be vindicated without triggering the 
controversy that often walks hand in hand with the quest for equal 
treatment. Even for those of us who believe in making overt 
demands for equality, we do not always agree on the proper 
means of achieving these goals. Moreover, these demands can 
complicate the struggle to protect equality norms when they are 
under assault, as they are now; second order doctrines are 
important alternatives when the goal is to preserve gains as 
opposed to breaking down existing barriers. Professor Tsai’s book 
is not only important, but it lays out a much-needed path forward 
for achieving equality in challenging times. For all of its attributes, 
however, the book also raises important questions about the 
circumstances in which the demand for equality must be overt, 
express, and uncompromising. While second-order doctrines are 
an important part of any strategy seeking to create a more just 
society, it is vital that they do not replace first-order calls for 
equality and justice. Equality must be both practical and radical. 
 
 1. Professor of Law, American University.  
 2. Professor of Law and Vice Dean for Faculty and Academic Affairs, University of 
Southern California Gould School of Law. Thanks to Emily Kong for research assistance. 
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PART I: EQUALITY BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY? 
There are many wonderful themes and concepts in Practical 
Equality around which even those with diametrically opposed 
views of equality can coalesce. The book does an excellent job of 
tying equality to broader notions of dignity and fairness 
underlying the second-order doctrines that it advocates, 
illustrating that its themes are not about progressive ideals but 
universal ones. Liberal organizations like the NAACP get similar 
treatment in the book as the conservative Lambs Chapel, showing 
how reliance on doctrines other than equality can transcend the 
differences that tend to prevent agreement about what equal 
treatment requires (p. 195). For this reason, the use of second-
order doctrines to achieve the goals of equality is attractive—it 
avoids antagonizing opponents, seeking to find common ground 
where none existed before, and it does so all in the name of justice. 
For example, the doctrine of fair play resolved difficult cases 
when courts were reluctant to commit to a broad reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in most contexts. In criminal justice 
cases, in particular, fair play has served to deliver justice to 
African-Americans accused of heinous crimes who confess only 
because of ill treatment at the hands of the police. While the 
equality implications of these cases might be clear to those who 
are committed to its terms, even courts unsympathetic to the 
plight of African-Americans in that space were forced to confront 
the fundamental injustice of coerced confessions (pp. 51-60). 
Because fair play is, according to Professor Tsai, based on “widely 
shared intuitions about how crucial decisions should be made,” it 
is, in some ways, more attractive than resolving cases by defining 
the scope of equal protection(pp. 67-68).3 Instead, it is far easier 
to determine what fair play prohibits. Wider reliance on notions 
of fair play could have special resonance in the death penalty 
context, where equality arguments have explicitly failed (pp. 80-
92). As Professor Tsai argues, statistics show that people are less 
in favor of criminal justice reform where they associate the 
criminal justice system with blackness, even while conceding that 
the challenged policy is cruel (pp. 80-92).4 Being aggressive in 
 
 3. Tsai notes that, with fair play, “[w]e don’t have to decide up front what kind of 
autonomy is involved or what its full scope should be in this context. We don’t even have 
to agree about every single element that would make something truly fair and equitable, 
as if we were designing an ideal process from scratch.”  
 4. See also pp. 148–49, discussing Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s striking 
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policing cruelty through fair play (and also through anti-cruelty 
doctrine) can do some of the work that equality doctrine would 
otherwise be tasked with in this context. 
Similarly, the rule of reasonableness is also attractive as an 
equality substitute. The rule is familiar, easy to implement, and it 
is a fundamental part of equality doctrine. The Equal Protection 
Clause, and its requirement of rationality, is simply another way 
of requiring the government to act reasonably. When the 
government departs from this baseline of reasonableness, which 
often occurs in the context of laws that favor discrete and insular 
minorities, the rule of reasonableness can fill the gap left by courts 
reluctant to explicitly evoke the Equal Protection Clause’s 
protected-class jurisprudence. The Supreme Court’s desire to 
categorize historically oppressed groups to determine scrutiny 
levels has not satisfactorily resolved the status of groups that have 
been oppressed but don’t fit into neat categories—the mentally 
disabled,5 the LGTBQ community,6 the politically unpopular,7 to 
name a few. The Court’s protected-class jurisprudence has not 
comfortably evolved to reflect the realities of our society, in which 
the historical experiences of groups are more likely to be accepted 
on their own merits rather than validated by the discriminatory 
experiences of others. For example, LGTBQ+ individuals have 
been persecuted, but the validity of their complaints should not 
depend on how their experiences compare to the experiences of 
groups to whom the Court does accord protection. 
The court’s protected class jurisprudence invites the use of 
the second-order doctrines that Professor Tsai champions in his 
book. Reasonableness does not require the Court to determine 
which groups are most oppressed and therefore worthy of the 
highest level of scrutiny, in essence a very unattractive method of 
comparing suffering. It is therefore acceptable to tell the City of 
Cleburne that it was unreasonable for the City to internalize the 
prejudices of its residents in refusing to give a permit to a home 
designed for the mentally disabled because the outcome would be 
the same if the mentally disabled was treated as a constitutionally 
 
down the death penalty, and noting that “reducing merciless treatment across the board 
can redound to the benefit of those who tend to feel the brunt of harsh policies.” 
 5. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 6. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
 7. United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
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protected group entitled to strict scrutiny under the Court’s 
caselaw. Similarly, it is unreasonable for the government to deny 
food stamps to hippies because legislators disapproved of their 
lifestyle. The rule of reasonableness does not require the plaintiffs 
to prove ill will, or that the mentally disabled and hippies are 
similarly situated to the groups (like African-Americans or 
women) that get special solicitude from the Court. The plaintiffs 
only have to show that the government was not acting for sound 
reasons (p. 111). 
Professor Tsai’s book persuasively shows that second-order 
doctrines can work in place of equality arguments. In thinking 
about the use of second-order doctrines, however, it is important 
to be clear about when these doctrines are adequate replacements 
and when they are less-preferred alternatives. For example, the 
Supreme Court has weaponized the First Amendment in cases 
like Citizens United v. F.E.C. in order to promote an absolutism 
divorced from the uses that the Warren Court employed to 
protect discrete and insular minorities.8 Under this view of the 
First Amendment, corporations and unions can spend in 
unlimited quantities, drowning out the voices of those who do not 
have equivalent resources. Relatedly, this interpretation of the 
First Amendment also protects a baker from having to make a 
cake for a gay couple for religious reasons, another implicit limit 
on the ability of second-order doctrines to do the work of equality 
when there are competing claims.9 For the Warren Court, the First 
Amendment was a useful vehicle for eradicating inequality faced 
by African-Americans during the Civil Rights era. The doctrine 
protected the associational rights of groups like the NAACP from 
crippling state legislation that would have forced them to cease 
operations in the state. Much of the utility of second-order 
doctrines depends on the Court that is employing them. For the 
Warren Court, the First Amendment was a paradigmatic example 
of what practical equality can achieve; for the Roberts Court, the 
First Amendment is a vehicle for preventing equality from 
becoming oppression, but at the expense of the most vulnerable 
members of society. 
There are similar limits to a rule of reasonableness as an 
equality substitute. On one hand, the Japanese internment was a 
 
 8. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (F.E.C.), 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 9. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
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clear example of government unreasonableness, because of its 
willingness to engage in racist behavior based on flimsy (and some 
might say nonexistent) evidence of disloyalty. While the rule of 
reasonableness might have been the vehicle that ultimately led to 
the Court to demand the release of a Japanese-American woman 
in Ex Parte Endo, its blanket endorsement of Japanese 
interenment in United States v. Korematsu illustrated how second-
best doctrines are just that—second best.10 The Japanese 
internment was less an instance of government unreasonableness, 
and more a situation in which the racism should have been directly 
called out in a way that could have led to more political 
accountability. As Endo shows, second-best solutions might not 
be ideal when they force individual victims to bear the burden of 
challenging a program that the government should have to defend 
in the first instance. Instead of forcing the government to come 
forward with compelling evidence to justify its blanket internment 
program in Korematsu, the Court ordered the release of one 
individual based on a lack of evidence of disloyalty. The 
government might have lost the battle in Endo, but with 
Korematsu, they won the war. 
Second-order doctrines can vindicate the interest of 
historically oppressed groups, but they can also contribute to their 
continued oppression. In some ways, the success of these 
doctrines is determined in no small part by the Court’s willingness 
to deploy them in a way that achieves the equality ideal, bringing 
us back to an area of contestation Professor Tsai hoped that the 
use of these doctrines would avoid. As the next section shows, 
there are also costs to second-order doctrines that have broader 
cultural consequences, and this should factor into any strategic 
decisions to deploy such doctrines as meaningful equality 
substitutes. 
PART II: THE COST OF SECOND-BEST STRATEGIES 
Ex Parte Endo and Korematsu squarely present the question 
of when equality advocates should force courts to confront 
inequality head on, particularly when evasion can further the 
oppression of discrete and insular minority groups. The voting 
rights context is one area in which our reluctance to call out 
 
 10. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 
(1944).  
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discrimination by name has had far reaching cultural 
consequences, and second-order doctrines have proved 
detrimental. For example, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
allows plaintiffs to prevail if they can show that any device used 
for voting has the effect of abridging the right to vote on the basis 
of race, neatly sidestepping any intent requirement. In the 
decades since the Act was amended to allow plaintiffs to prevail 
by showing effect alone, it has become one of the most potent 
tools in the arsenal of civil rights advocates. Similarly, Sections 
4(b) and 5 of the Act required that certain covered jurisdictions 
preclear all changes to their voting laws with the federal 
government before those changes could go into effect. The 
Department of Justice would block the implementation of any law 
that it found to be discriminatory in intent or effect. Again, 
reliance on discriminatory effect made it much easier to block 
laws than if the Department had to establish the existence of 
discriminatory intent alone. 
While litigation under Section 2 and preclearance under 
Sections 4(b) and 5 were not without their challenges,11 the 
effects-only regime has had negative impacts, which voting rights 
advocates did not have to directly confront until the Shelby 
County v. Holder case.12 In Shelby County, the Court invalidated 
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, on the grounds that the 
coverage formula was based on racially discriminatory practices, 
such as literacy tests and poll taxes, which did not reflect the 
current racial climate of the country.13 The Court touted the 
progress in African-American voter registration and turnout that 
has been achieved in the years since the Voting Rights Act 
became law, which illustrated, as one scholar eloquently put it, 
that “Bull Connor is dead.”14 
The Supreme Court created the post-racial narrative in 
Shelby County, because the reluctance in recent years to call out 
intentional discrimination, facilitated by the fact that the law 
required no showing of intent, gave them cover to claim that 
 
 11. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (stating that Section 2 did not 
protect districts that were less than fifty percent majority-minority); Reno v. Bossier 
Parish, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (holding that the government had to preclear a redistricting 
plan enacted with discriminatory, but nonretrogressive, purpose).  
 12. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 13. Id. at 555. 
 14. Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act after Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 179 (2005). 
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racism no longer existed. NAMUDNO v. Holder presented this 
dynamic in stark fashion. In NAMUDNO, the Court intimated at 
length that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was 
unconstitutional, but application of the constitutional avoidance 
canon would give Congress an opportunity to fix the statute. 
Here, the second-order doctrine was the constitutional avoidance 
canon, and equality advocates were more than happy to fall in line 
behind this use of the doctrine, so long as the preclearance regime 
survived to live another day. Yet, when the Court invalidated the 
coverage formula of Section 4(b) four years later, in Shelby v. 
Holder, the Court made it difficult to envision that any type of 
remedy would have been appropriate, especially since much of its 
opinion was based on a post-racialism which suggested that the 
Act was outdated because of its federalism costs.15 Congress, even 
if it had been functional enough to amend Sections 4(b) and 5 
during the period between NAMUDNO and Shelby, was likely in 
a lose-lose situation, given the chasm between the Court’s 
deference to Congress in 200916 and the Court’s 2013 intervention 
to save “Our Federalism” from a threat that no longer existed.17 
 
 15. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 540, 547 (arguing that the preclearance regime, as then 
constituted, was no longer warranted because “blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal 
decrees are rare,” “minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels,” and the “tests 
and devices that blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 
years”); but see id. at 565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees held 21 hearings, heard from scores of witnesses, and received a number of 
investigative reports and other written documentation of continuing discrimination in 
covered jurisdictions. In all, the legislative record Congress compiled filled more than 
15,000 pages. The compilation presents countless ‘examples of flagrant racial 
discrimination’ since the last reauthorization; Congress also brought to light systematic 
evidence that ‘intentional racial discrimination in voting remains so serious and 
widespread in covered jurisdictions that section 5 preclearance is still needed.’”). 
 16. Compare Northwest Austin Municipal District Number One (NAMUDNO) v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 205 (2009), with Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 556. In Shelby County, the 
Court did not resolve the question of what standard of review applies to Congress’s 
exercises of authority under the Fifteenth Amendment, making it difficult for Congress to 
legislate in this area moving forward. See Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 542 n.1 (stating that 
“Northwest Austin guides our review under both Amendments in this case”); but see 
NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 204 (“The parties do not agree on the standard to apply in 
deciding whether, in light of the foregoing concerns, Congress exceeded its Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement power in extending the preclearance requirements . . . . That 
question has been extensively briefed in this case, but we need not resolve it. The Act’s 
preclearance requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions 
under either test.”).  
 17. See Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 
89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 393 (2015) (“The Shelby County decision suggests that the Court is 
gravitating away from a broad interpretation of Congress’s enforcement authority that 
would allow it to regulate otherwise constitutional conduct in order to 
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In 2009, it was not advantageous to call out the Court for its failure 
to speak in terms of equality, for its refusal to recognize that 
discrimination not only existed but required continuing federal 
oversight; instead, equality advocates took the crumb that was 
handed to them and lost the war four years later. 
And the post-Shelby world continues to struggle with using 
the language of equality in the voting rights context, relying on 
arguments centered in federalism and faux outrage so as to ignore 
that the past is not really past. In Veasey v. Abbott, for example, a 
panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated Texas’s 
voter identification law as a violation of Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, but the court relied on an effects analysis, in part, 
because it was uncomfortable with finding that the state engaged 
in intentional discrimination that violated the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.18 In rejecting the district court’s analysis 
of the constitutional claim, in which the lower court determined 
that the state had acted with discriminatory intent, the appeals 
court parsed the evidence in a very formalistic manner, relying on 
older instances of discrimination to validate the statutory claim 
that the law had a discriminatory effect,19 while disregarding this 
evidence with respect to whether the state had violated the 
Constitution.20 
Both the Fifth Circuit panel and the en banc Fifth Circuit that 
later reviewed the case also shied away from relying on an 
intentional discrimination framework, finding that, while there 
was enough evidence to support a finding of invidious purpose, 
the case should be remanded . . . to determine whether there 
should be a finding of invidious purpose.21 Although the Fifth 
 
deter constitutional violations.”); see also Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The 
Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1392–93 
(2015) (arguing that proposed fixes to the VRA then under discussion “will simply increase 
the risk that the current Court majority further dismantles—and hastens the demise of—
the remaining provisions of the Act” because “the Court no longer believes that 
intentional racial discrimination by state actors remains the dominant problem of 
democratic politics.”).  
 18. Cf. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 501–02 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing the 
difficulty of establishing discriminatory intent on the part of an entire legislative body). 
 19. See id. at 504–05, 509–11. 
 20. See id. at 500. 
 21. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 241 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“In sum, although 
some of the evidence on which the district court relied was infirm, there remains evidence 
to support a finding that the cloak of ballot integrity could be hiding a more invidious 
purpose . . . . [S]ince there is more than one way to decide this case, and the right court to 
make those findings is the district court, we must remand . . . .”). 
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Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the original panel that some 
of the intent evidence was infirm,22 the en banc majority conceded 
that there was evidence of intent on the part of the Texas 
Legislature that fell squarely within the intentional discrimination 
paradigm outlined in the Supreme Court decision of Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 
This evidence included departures from normal procedures; 
questionable statements and omissions from legislators who 
supported the bill; the tenuousness of the legislature’s stated 
purpose for passing the bill; and contemporary examples of state-
sponsored discrimination.23 
The court was much more comfortable with assessing the 
Section 2 violation, with the statute functioning as a second-order 
doctrine in this context, much like the doctrines discussed in 
Professor Tsai’s book. Section 2 may relieve plaintiffs of the 
obligation to prove discriminatory intent, but its use has also 
conditioned courts to question the very existence of 
discriminatory intent, even in the face of substantial evidence of 
intent. 
In fact, the suggestion that the State of Texas might have 
acted with discriminatory intent enraged the dissenters, who 
accused the majority of engaging in “racial name calling,” merely 
by remanding for a determination of whether the state acted with 
invidious purpose. Additionally, the dissenters suggested that the 
majority’s application of Section 2 rendered that statute 
constitutionally suspect, because “a wide swath of racially neutral 
election measures will be subject to challenge, a previously 
unthinkable result under the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Constitution’s federalist design.”24 
While no one has to be labeled a racist in order for 
discriminatory purpose to be present,25 there are more significant 
 
 22. Id. at 230–31, 241. 
 23. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 698-702 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015), reh’g granted, 815 
F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 2016) (mem.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 830 F.3d 216 
(5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–68 (1977). 
 24. Veasy, 830 F.3d at 317 (opinion of Clement). 
 25. Id. at 335 (opinion of Costa). As Judge Costa observed: 
Reluctance to hold that a legislature passed a law with a discriminatory purpose 
is understandable. Yet . . . [i]t is also important to note that affirming the finding 
of discriminatory purpose would not be the inflammatory “racial name-calling” 
that Judge Jones’s dissent suggests. Such a finding, although one of grave 
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concerns that inure from avoiding an intentional discrimination 
finding than maintaining politeness. Notably, the remedies 
available to plaintiffs can be significantly hampered by a refusal 
to call out discrimination by name. Had the initial Fifth Circuit 
panel found that Texas engaged in intentional discrimination,26 
the court could have bailed the jurisdiction back into preclearance 
under Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act.27  
Eventually, the case worked its way back down and then up 
to the Fifth Circuit again, before a new panel that would reject 
arguments that the voter identification law violated either Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution.28 Thus, refusing to 
confront the question of intentional discrimination ultimately had 
a catastrophic effect. Invalidation of the law and forcing Texas 
back into preclearance under Section 3 of the VRA was the more 
appropriate—and just—remedy given the intent evidence before 
the court. The decision of the original panel and the en banc court 
to punt on the question of discriminatory intent led, first, to a 
“softening” of the Texas voter identification law, in which an 
affidavit option was added to the list of acceptable identification 
and, later, a complete rejection of any statutory and constitutional 
claims by a more hostile panel.29  
The Veasey case is a manifestation of the failure to explicitly 
call out breaches of equality and its unforeseen consequences. 
 
importance, is not tantamount to a finding that the law had a “racist motivation.” 
As Judge Kozinski explained in a decision upholding a district court 
determination that a discriminatory purpose motivated a Los Angeles county 
reapportionment plan, nothing in an opinion finding discriminatory purpose 
needs to even “suggest[ ]” that lawmakers “harbored any ethnic or racial 
animus.” Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 778 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring). The discriminatory purpose can instead be the product 
of “elected officials engag[ing] in the single-minded pursuit of incumbency.” That 
most basic of human instincts—self-preservation—can thus provide an 
explanation for enacting a law at least in part because it will have a disparate 
impact on protected groups that favor the out-of-power party. Indeed, the highly 
polarized nature of voting in Texas along racial lines (according to exit polls from 
the last gubernatorial election, 72% of whites, 44% percent of Latinos, and 7% 
of African-Americans voted for the Republican winner) makes depressing 
minority turnout a strong proxy for suppressing Democratic turnout.  
 26.  The court remanded because there was circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent. See Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487, 493 (2015), reh’g granted, 815 
F.3d 958 (5th Cir. 2016) (mem.), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 830 F.3d 216 
(5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017). 
 27. Section 3 of the VRA allows a judge, upon a finding of discriminatory intent, to 
bail a jurisdiction back into the preclearance regime. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c).  
 28. Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 29. See Veasy, 796 F.3d, note 22, at 519–20. 
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The culture of not calling out discrimination by name has 
empowered courts to treat any call for equality as a request for an 
extraordinary remedy, an unfortunate development which was 
front and center in the recent case of Abbott v. Perez. At issue in 
Abbott was whether the Texas state legislature acted with 
discriminatory intent when it enacted redistricting plans that 
allegedly diluted the votes of minorities. The legislature—
ironically the same legislature that enacted the voter 
identification law at issue in Veasey v. Abbott— originally adopted 
redistricting plans in 2011 that never went into effect, but were 
found by a three judge panel to have been adopted with racially 
discriminatory intent.30 In 2013, Texas repealed the 2011 plans and 
replaced interim, court-drawn plans with new plans that were also 
challenged as discriminatory in intent and effect on constitutional 
and statutory grounds.31 The lower court invalidated the 2013 
plans, holding that the state legislature had failed to purge the 
discriminatory taint of the original 2011 plans when it adopted the 
2013 version. The Supreme Court, in finding that the legislature’s 
intent in 2011 was irrelevant to the 2013 plans, held that the lower 
court erroneously disregarded the presumption that the 
legislature acted in good faith, a presumption that is “not changed 
by a finding of past discrimination.”32 Instead, a court “‘must be 
sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a 
legislature’s redistricting calculus.’ And the ‘good faith of [the] 
state legislature must be presumed.’”33 
Abbott v. Perez stands for the uncomfortable proposition 
that, despite evidence that two lower courts in two different 
circuits in two different cases found to be indicative of 
discriminatory intent, courts should assume that the state 
legislature acted in good faith even in the face of claims of 
discriminatory intent. In this way, Abbott is consistent with the 
post-racialism of Shelby County, which viewed liability under a 
discriminatory effects framework, which does not require any 
evidence of intent, as tantamount to calling otherwise good 
people racists. The discriminatory effects approach of Section 2 of 
the VRA had long sustained civil rights advocates challenging 
state voting laws, but these cases signal the true danger that 
 
 30. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2316 (2018). 
 31. Id. at 2317. 
 32. Id. at 2324. 
 33. Id.  
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statute faces in the coming years. When we fail to speak in the 
language of equality—directly, clearly, and without 
compromise—we empower its opponents to craft the narrative, 
no matter how erroneous and harmful, about what equality 
should look like, and we endanger the victories achieved through 
second-order doctrines. 
CONCLUSION: BE PRACTICAL AND CALL OUT 
DISCRIMINATION BY NAME 
Practical Equality illustrates the obvious benefits of second-
order doctrines, and persuasively shows the value in achieving 
equality through other means. Professor Tsai recognizes that 
there is a time and place for the public condemnation that comes 
with identifying injustice, and he has given equality advocates 
much to think about with respect to the strategies that they pursue 
to achieve a more egalitarian society. But, as the Voting Rights 
Act illustrates, there has been a cost to the refusal to call out 
discrimination by name (p. 18). Voting rights is one area in which 
an intentional discrimination finding could have achieved more 
for equality than second-order doctrines that have been, until 
recently, useful for constraining state action. Sometimes the 
stigma and backlash are a small price to pay for demanding 
explicit adherence to basic equality norms, even if, to use 
Professor Tsai’s words, “our tone is necessarily judgmental” (p. 
18). Second-order doctrines must be a part of any litigation 
strategy seeking to enforce equality, but let us not silence our 
demands for equality because our silence could hasten, rather 
than prevent, the very future that we are trying to avoid. 
 
